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ABSTRACT
Based on the brain in a vat thought experiment, skeptics argue that 
we cannot have certain knowledge. At the same time, we do have the 
intuition that we know some things with certainty. A way to justify 
this intuition is given by semantic contextualists who argue that the 
word “knows” is context sensitive. However, many have objected to 
the intelligibility of this claim. In response, another approach called 
“moderate pragmatic contextualism” was invoked, which claims 
that “knows” itself is not context sensitive, but knowledge assertions 
are. I show, however, that to refute skepticism, moderate pragmatic 
contextualism rests on unjustified and implausible assumptions as well. 
Since no form of contextualism works as a response to skepticism, I 
argue that we should simply accept skepticism. However, I argue that 
skepticism is not a problem because skeptic pragmatic contextualism 
can offer a plausible explanation of why we have the intuition that 
our ordinary knowledge claims are true, even though they are not. 
I conclude that skeptic pragmatic contextualism offers the most 
plausible response to the brain in a vat thought experiment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the brain in a vat thought experiment (“BIV”), we are asked 
to imagine that we are brains in vats whose experiences are caused by 
a supercomputer. Since the experiences of the brains are stipulated to 
be equal to ours, it seems that we cannot know that we are not brains 
in vats, as we have no way to tell other than our own experiences. 
According to skeptics, BIV therefore shows that we can never be sure 
about the existence of the external world. However, intuitively we have 
the feeling that we do know certain things about the external world. For 
example, that we have a body with legs, arms, and a head. In this way, 
we arrive at a paradox. On the one hand, BIV shows that we cannot have 
knowledge of the external world, while on the other hand we have the 
intuition that we do have some knowledge of the external world. 
So, one of the two claims has to go. Either we cannot have 
knowledge about the external world and skepticism is right, or there 
must be some way we can know that we are not brains in vats and 
skepticism is false. Semantic contextualism is a recent and fiercely 
debated position that tries to defend the latter option by arguing 
that “knows” is context sensitive.1 I elaborate on this proposal in 
section II. Many have objected, however, to the intelligibility of 
this claim. Stainton and Pynn invoked another approach, called 
“moderate pragmatic contextualism,” which I discuss in section III.2 
This approach argues that “knows” itself is not context sensitive, but 
knowledge assertions are. To refute skepticism, moderate pragmatic 
contextualism relies on the claim that “knows” is a low demanding 
epistemic relation. However, I demonstrate that this is another 
implausible and unjustified assumption.
My aim in this essay will be to show that since no form of 
contextualism works as a response to skepticism, we should 
consider accepting skepticism. In section IV, I finally propose 
a third kind of contextualism, namely skeptic pragmatic 
contextualism. In skeptic pragmatic contextualism, knowledge 
assertions are again context sensitive, but “knows” refers to a high 
demanding epistemic relation, making skepticism true. Skeptic 
pragmatic contextualism can offer a plausible explanation of why 
we have the intuition that our ordinary knowledge claims are 
1 All kinds of contextualism that I discuss in this essay are epistemic, as 
they make a claim about knowledge. For brevity, however, I refer to it as 
“contextualism,” instead of “epistemic contextualism.” 
2 Robert Stainton, “Contextualism in Epistemology and the Context-
Sensitivity of ‘Knows’,” in Knowledge and Skepticism, ed. Joseph Keim 
Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry Silverstein (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 2010), 137-163; Geoff Pynn, “Pragmatic Contextualism,” 
Metaphilosophy 46, no. 1 (2015): 26-51, 10.1111/meta.12120.
true, even though they are not. I conclude that skeptic pragmatic 
contextualism offers the most plausible response to BIV.  
II. SEMANTIC CONTEXTUALISM AND 
SKEPTICISM
According to skepticism, we cannot have knowledge about the 
external world. This thesis is supported by the brain in a vat thought 
experiment (BIV) which asks us to imagine that we are disembodied 
brains in vats. Our brains are connected to a supercomputer that 
stimulates our brains in the same way that our actual brains are 
stimulated when perceiving the external world. As a result, our 
evidence about the external world is the same even though there is no 
external world. From this, skeptics conclude that we have no way to tell 
whether we are brains in vats or not. Based on this thought experiment, 
skeptics argue that there are many common-sense beliefs that we think 
we know, but in fact do not know. One is the belief that we have hands. 
The skeptic shows that this belief is inconsistent with the possibility of 
being a brain in a vat and thus false: 
P1 I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat
P2     If I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, then I do not know   
 that I have hands
C      I do not know that I have hands
Both premises seem true, yet the conclusion is not one we are keen 
to accept. After all, we do seem to intuitively know that we have 
hands. Therefore, contextualists try to explain how the conclusion, in 
a sense, can be false, even though we do not always know that we are 
not brains in a vat.3 According to contextualists, the reason is that the 
word “knows” is context sensitive. Sentences of the form “S knows 
that P” are not simply true or false; rather, the truth-conditions of these 
kinds of sentences depend on the context of utterance. This kind of 
contextualism is called “semantic contextualism,” because it makes a 
claim about the semantics of the word “knows.” 
Based on the context sensitivity of “knows,” semantic contextualists 
offer a response to BIV. They argue that uttering something such as 
Premise 1 changes the context in a way where knowledge becomes 
harder to acquire. However, we normally do not think about skeptical 
scenarios; for that reason, the standards for knowledge are normally not 
that high. Thus, semantic contextualists argue that both our ordinary 
3 See David Lewis, “Elusive knowledge,” Australian Journal of Philosophy 74, 
no. 4 (1996): 549-567, 10.1080/00048409612347521; or Keith DeRose, The 
Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, vol. 2 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2018) for examples of semantic contextualism.
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knowledge claims and skeptic claims are, in a sense, true. I am right when 
I say, “I know I have hands,” while at the same time the skeptic is right to 
say that we cannot know that we are not brains in vats. The crux is that 
the word “knows” picks out different relations in different contexts. 
Essential to the semantic contextualist response to BIV is the claim 
that “knows” is context sensitive. However, this is far from obvious. 
Early semantic contextualists have tried to argue for the context 
sensitivity of “knows” by drawing an analogy with gradable adjectives 
such as “flat” and “small.”4 When talking about elephants the standard 
for “small” is rather high, whereas the standard is low when talking 
about insects. For this reason, the word “small” is said to be context 
sensitive. Stanley has pointed out that what is characteristic about 
gradable adjectives is that they permit degree modifiers.5 We can say, 
for example, that a certain elephant is small, though not very small. 
The word “knows,” however, does not permit degree modifiers.6 We 
cannot say “I very know that the elephant is small.” Moreover, gradable 
adjectives all have a comparative form, whereas “knows” does not.7 We 
can say that something is smaller, but we cannot say, “I know more that 
the elephant is small.” Since “knows” does not behave like a gradable 
adjective, Stanley concludes that we should be very suspicious of the 
claim that “knows” is context sensitive.8 
In response to this objection, later semantic contextualists have 
tried to justify the context sensitivity of “knows” in other ways. Some 
have tried to compare it with indexicals, like “today” and “I,” others 
with ternary relational terms, such as “prefers.”9 However, the linguistic 
differences continued. Thus, there seems to be no linguistic category 
that exactly matches with “knows.” Some have argued that “knows” 
is a context sensitive category on its own.10 This is not impossible, but 
one needs solid reasons to explain why “knows” would be such an 
exceptional category and such reasons thus far have not been given. 
Therefore, given that there is no obvious semantical evidence, semantic 
contextualism does look rather implausible. 
4 Robert Hambourger, “Justified Assertion and the Relativity of Knowledge,” 
Philosophical Studies 51, no. 2 (1987): 241-269, 10.1007/BF00353649
5 Jason Stanley, “On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism,” Philosophical 
Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 119, no. 1/2 
(2004): 123, 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000029353.14987.34.
6 Stanley, “Linguistic Basis for Contextualism,” 125.
7 Stanley, “Linguistic Basis for Contextualism,” 124-125.
8 Stanley, “Linguistic Basis for Contextualism,” 130.
9 Stewart Cohen, “How to be a Fallibilist,” Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 91-123, 
10.2307/2214070; Jonathan Schaffer, “From Contextualism to Contrastivism,” 
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 
119, no. 1/2 (2004): 73-103, 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000029351.56460.8c.
10 Nikola Kompa, “The Context Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions,” Grazer 
Philosophische Studien 61, no. 1 (2002): 1-18, 10.1163/18756735-90000772.
III. MODERATE PRAGMATIC CONTEXTUALISM
Pynn and Stainton argue that there is a different kind of 
contextualism, namely pragmatic contextualism, that can give a similar 
response to BIV without requiring “knows” to be context sensitive.11 
Instead, pragmatic contextualists argue that what is asserted by 
knowledge claims is context sensitive. There is a distinction between 
what a sentence semantically expresses and what a speaker tries to assert 
with a sentence.12 The former is determined by the rules of language—
thus by the meaning of the word “knows”—and determines the truth 
conditions of the sentence. The latter is determined by the intention of 
the speaker. The point is that some knowledge claims assert something 
different than they semantically express. This clarifies how the skeptic’s 
claim that we cannot know that we are not brains in vats, and our daily 
life knowledge claims, like, “I know I have hands,” can both be true in a 
sense. One claim is semantically true and the other is true pragmatically. 
Now the important question: which one is semantically true? 
Pynn argues that it is our ordinary knowledge claim, as he holds that 
“knows” refers to a low demanding epistemic relation that is relatively 
easy to achieve .13 This kind of contextualism is called “moderate 
pragmatic contextualism.” Thus, when I utter, “I know I have hands,” 
I am saying something semantically true. In contrast, when I utter, “I 
do not know that I am not a brain in a vat,” I am saying something 
semantically false. 
If true, moderate pragmatic contextualism would be able to 
refute skepticism, without relying on the implausible assumption that 
“knows” is context sensitive. Moderate pragmatic contextualism, 
however, has problems of its own. First, it seems implausible that I only 
assert something true, and not semantically express something true by 
saying, “I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat.” When there is 
a difference between what a sentence semantically expresses and what 
is asserted by a sentence, we can always respond with “Considered 
literally, that is false,” whereupon the speaker will say, “If you want 
to be that precise, you are right. I meant to say something different.” 
For example, if I say, “I ate a plate of pasta,” someone might respond, 
“That is false, because you did not eat the plate itself.” I would then 
answer, “True, I mean I ate a portion of pasta as big as a normal plate.” 
Back to the brain in a vat example, would a similar scenario happen 
11 Pynn, “Pragmatic Contextualism,” 26-51; Stainton, “Contextualism in 
Eeistemology,” 137-163.
12 Pynn, “Pragmatic Contextualism,” 29.
13 Pynn, “Pragmatic Contextualism,” 34.
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when I utter that I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat? Probably 
not. If someone responded to me by saying, “Literally, that is false, 
maybe you mean something else?” I cannot imagine I would answer, 
“You are right, I meant that if knowledge was a high demanding 
epistemic relation, then I would not know that I am not a brain in a 
vat.” No, I would answer, “I do not mean something else; I think we 
literally cannot know that we are not brains in vats.” 
The whole point of BIV is to show that we can never know that 
the external world exists. So, we cannot assume that knowledge is a low 
demanding epistemic relation, and then use this as an argument against 
skepticism. Pynn and Stainton are basically assuming in this way that 
we can know that we are not brains in vats. But how can we know this? 
An additional argument would be needed to show that knowledge is a 
relatively low demanding epistemic relation, so that we can know that 
we are not brains in vats. As neither Pynn nor Stainton gives one, they 
are simply begging the question. 
Finally, moderate pragmatic contextualism implies a rejection of 
the closure principle. According to the closure principle, if S knows P 
and S knows that P entails Q, then S knows Q. Schematically:
P1 S knows P
P2 S knows that P entails Q
C S knows Q
For example, suppose I know that it is raining. Furthermore, I know that 
when it is raining, it is cloudy. Then I know it is cloudy. Recall BIV:
P1 I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat
P2 If I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, then I do not know   
 that I have hands
C I do not know that I have hands
We can see that the argument is an instance of the closure principle. 
After all, the fact that I do not know that I am a not a brain in a vat 
entails that I do not know that I have hands. However, according to 
moderate pragmatic contextualism “I know I have hands” is literally 
true, whereas “I know I am not a brain in a vat” is literally false. As 
such, they must reject the closure principle, since they argue that it is 
possible to know that you have hands without knowing that you are 
not a brain in vat. It is possible to reject the closure principle to refute 
skepticism.14 However, rejecting closure involves embracing that it 
would be possible for me to say, “I know I have hands, while I do 
14 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1981); Fred Dretske, “The Case Against Closure,” in Contemprary 
Debates in Epistemology, 2nd ed. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 27-40, 
for example, have done this. 
not know I am not a handless brain in a vat.” This sounds downright 
contradictory. It is precisely because contextualists found this move 
implausible that they came up with another way to refute skepticism.15 
The fact that moderate pragmatic contextualism still implies a rejection 
of the closure principle shows that something has gone profoundly 
wrong with this proposal. 
In sum, the aim of moderate pragmatic contextualism was to 
overcome the linguistic problems of semantic contextualism. I have 
shown, however, that moderate pragmatic contextualism has its own 
problems. Firstly, it seems implausible that we can only assert something 
to be true by saying we do not know that we are not brains in vats. 
Secondly, moderate pragmatic contextualism is unjustified to assume 
that knowledge is a low demanding epistemic relation. Finally, it 
implies a rejection of the closure principle. Hence, moderate pragmatic 
contextualism is not able to give an appealing response to skepticism. 
IV. SKEPTIC PRAGMATIC CONTEXTUALISM
We have seen that both semantic contextualism and moderate 
pragmatic contextualism rest on implausible and unjustified assumptions 
to refute skepticism. Yet, we do need to answer the question, “Do I 
know that I have hands or not?” As there seems no satisfactory way to 
reject skepticism, I propose we should accept it. It thus turns out we 
cannot have knowledge about the external world, thereby admitting that 
it is literally false that I know that I have hands, and literally true that I do 
not know that I am not a brain in a vat. 
Yet, what I will call “skeptic pragmatic contextualism” is still able 
to explain why we do seem to have knowledge about various ordinary 
things. Skeptic pragmatic contextualism differs from moderate pragmatic 
contextualism only in holding that “knows” semantically refers to a high 
demanding epistemic relation, rather than a low demanding epistemic 
relation. As a result, in contrast to moderate pragmatic contextualists, 
skeptic pragmatic contextualists grant skeptics that it is literally true that 
we do not know that we have hands. Meanwhile, just like moderate 
pragmatic contextualism, skeptic pragmatic contextualism acknowledges 
that what is asserted by knowledge claims is context sensitive. Therefore, 
skeptic pragmatic contextualism explains why, although our ordinary 
knowledge claims are all literally false, they can all assert something 
true. In this way, the skeptic pragmatic contextualist can accommodate 
the intuition that we do have the feeling we know we have hands, as 
15 See Keith DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” 29. Semantic 
contextualists can preserve closure, provided we hold our context of 
attribution constant. For moderate pragmatic contextualists this move is 
not available, as closure fails even within the same (literal) context. 
114 WE DON’T KNOW WE HAVE HANDS 115 STANCE | VOL. 13
the semantic meaning is different from what we try to assert by the 
statement, “I know I have hands.” The assertion, “I know I have hands,” 
seems intuitively true because I do not intend to say that I am one 
hundred percent sure that I have hands, but rather that on the condition 
I am not a handless brain in a vat, I am sure I have hands. When we have 
the feeling that we have knowledge about the external world, we are 
thus confusing the semantic meaning of “knows” with what we mean 
by uttering knowledge claims. BIV seems paradoxical, because we are 
mixing up semantic meanings with assertions.   
In this way, skeptic pragmatic contextualism can explain the 
seeming paradox raised by BIV, and can also satisfactorily explain many 
of our ordinary knowledge attributing practices. Consider the following 
scenario sketched by Cohen: 
Mary is at the airport considering taking a certain flight to New York. 
She wants to know whether the flight has a layover in Chicago. She 
overhears someone ask a passenger Smith if he knows whether the 
flight stops in Chicago. Smith looks at the flight itinerary he got from 
the travel agent and responds, “Yes I know — it does stop in Chicago.” It 
turns out that Mary has an important business contact she has to make 
at the Chicago airport. Mary wonders, “How reliable is that itinerary? It 
could contain a misprint. They could have changed the schedule at the 
last minute.” Mary concludes that Smith does not really know that the 
plane will stop in Chicago. She decides to check with the airline agent. 16
In the example, both Smith, who says he knows that the flight stops in 
Chicago, and Mary, who says she does not know that the flight stops 
in Chicago, seem to be right. Yet, their assertions contradict each 
other. Skeptic pragmatic contextualism can explain this by pointing 
out that Mary and Smith assert something different by saying, “I 
know the plane stops in Chicago.” Smith asserts that according to his 
flight itinerary, there is a layover in Chicago. Mary, in contrast, wants 
to know whether there will be a layover in Chicago according to the 
latest schedule. Therefore, Mary concludes that Smith does not know 
whether the plane stops in Chicago according to the latest schedule. 
This shows that skeptic pragmatic contextualism is not just an ad hoc 
response to skepticism, but that there are good reasons—independent 
of BIV—to believe in skeptic pragmatic contextualism. 
One might object that it seems implausible that we are using 
“knows” in a lenient way all the time. However, if we take a closer 
look at our ordinary talk, it turns out that we speak loosely not only 
about knowledge, but about many things. I also say that I do not 
16 Stewart Cohen, “Contextualism, Skepticism, and The Structure of Reasons,” 
Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 59, 10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.3.
drink, which is literally false, when I mean to say that I do not drink 
alcohol. When I say that my phone is empty, this is literally false, 
as my phone is not hollow from the inside. In this vein, Unger has 
argued that our knowledge claims are idealizations, just as much 
of our daily talk consists of idealizations.17 Think of “flatness” and 
“circularity.” Nothing in the world is perfectly flat or circular, yet 
we often find ourselves saying things like “the Netherlands are flat” 
or “coins are circular.” Thus, it is not strange at all to admit that we 
make false knowledge claims all the time. Rather, it would be strange 
if knowledge claims were an exception to the rest of our ordinary 
idealized talk.
As we have seen in the previous paragraph, earlier forms of 
contextualism are criticized for begging the question against skepticism. 
Semantic contextualists claim that in daily life “knows” has a different 
meaning, and moderate pragmatic contextualists claim that skeptics 
assert something different by knowledge claims than ordinary speakers. 
However, skeptics claim that we cannot ever have certain knowledge, 
not even in a daily-life context. As such, earlier forms of contextualism 
simply bypass the skeptic without further justification. Skeptic 
pragmatic contextualism, on the other hand, cannot be criticized for 
this. After all, according to skeptic pragmatic contextualism, skepticism 
is simply true: we cannot have certain knowledge. However, I have 
tried to make clear in this paper that this should not bother us in our 
daily lives. By making a distinction between assertions and semantic 
meanings, skeptic pragmatic contextualism explains why we still use 
the word “knows” so much in our everyday life. We speak loosely 
when making knowledge assertions, thus making literally false, but 
assertedly true claims. As we have seen, this happens to not only to be 
the case for knowledge claims, but for most of our ordinary speech. I 
therefore conclude that skeptic pragmatic contextualism offers the most 
appealing response to BIV. 
V. CONCLUSION
In this essay, I have shown that there is a straightforward argument 
available for skeptic pragmatic contextualism showing that it is not 
strange that our ordinary knowledge claims are literally false. When 
making a knowledge claim in daily life we speak loosely, just as we 
speak loosely about countless other things in our daily lives. Therefore, 
I conclude that skeptic pragmatic contextualism offers the most 
appealing response to the brain in a vat thought experiment.
17 Peter Unger, Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1975). 
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